I. INTRODUCTION
It is now well settled that to create a valid charitable trust, the settlor must intentionally settle property on trust for a charitable purpose which is for the 'public benefit'. 1 This latter requirement is known as 'the public benefit requirement' and at common law it encapsulates two ideas: first, that the nature of the purportedly-charitable purpose must be a benefit to the community; and second, that those who benefit from the purportedly-charitable purpose must be sufficiently numerous to constitute a 'section of the public'. 2 The Charities Act 2011
To support this argument, four steps will be taken. First, three incorrect hypotheses will be identified and the relevance of the modern bifurcation of public benefit will be explained.
Second, to give chronology to the inquiry, the history of the usage of legal remarks concerning the need for public benefit for a valid charitable trust, both implied and explicit, will be mapped.
Third, the four contextual factors which created the background to the adoption of the public benefit requirement will be explored. Finally, this article will show how nineteenth century judges borrowed ideas of public benefit from earlier mortmain case law to formally adopt the public benefit requirement for charitable validity.
II. A USEFUL FRAMEWORK AND THREE INCORRECT HYPOTHESES
Before we begin, three incorrect hypotheses must be discarded as irrelevant to our historical analysis: the relevance of a presumption of public benefit, the relevance of cy-près, and the supposed purpose of charity under the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601. 10 However, it will be explained that the modern trend of separating out different senses within the public benefit requirement is a helpful tool to analyse the nineteenth century case law.
Distinct components of public benefit: a useful framework
At least since 1953, commentators have sought to distinguish two components of the public benefit requirement -first, the charitable trust confers a benefit on society, and second, the benefit accrues to a sufficiently wide class of people. 11 Recently, a similar distinction was accepted by the Upper Tier Tribunal in the Independent Schools Council case where it distinguished 'public benefit in the first sense', which requires the nature of the purpose to be a benefit to the community, from 'public benefit in the second sense', which requires those who benefit from the charity to be sufficiently numerous to constitute a 'section of the public'.
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Two recent commentators have distinguished further principles within the public benefit requirement. Professor Jonathan Garton has persuasively distinguished four components in the public benefit requirement. 13 For Garton, the public benefit requirement:
identifies the abstract purposes which are charitable ('conceptual public benefit'); determines whether meaningful benefit results from carrying out a particular purpose ('demonstrable Tribunal, 20 and Garton's fourfold terminology, will be used to explain precisely what the public benefit requirement demanded in the early cases.
A presumption of public benefit: an incorrect hypothesis
Professor Matthew Harding 21 and the Charity Commission 22 have suggested that implicit presumptions of public benefit operated for centuries. However, none of the old cases relied on in either argument show any actual reliance on presumptions, let alone explicit usage of such a phrase. Instead, what we see is judges taking notice of incontrovertibly-beneficial purposes 23 or personally investigating the purpose to conclude 'the benefits speak for themselves '. 24 Crucially, the cases relied upon concern very common and clearly beneficial charitable purposes but for religions which were not legally tolerated at that point. This meant that judges were skipping over charitable validity without discussion of public benefit to apply the doctrine of cy-près and/or to avoid intestacy. 25 Therefore, the orthodox position, that 'presumptions' of public benefit cannot be traced further back than the 1940s, 26 seems justified, and the idea of a presumption of public benefit need not feature in our historical analysis.
The relevance of cy-près: an incorrect hypothesis
One might attempt to rely on the doctrine of cy-près to explain the development of the public benefit requirement. Cy-près refers to the power of the court to apply charitable trust property for other, similar charitable purposes where the intended purpose cannot be carried out precisely as intended by the donor. The development of a (broad) public benefit requirement as the key criterion in charitable validity could be explained as a means by which the courts gave a broad definition to charity to facilitate the use of cy-près to assist charitable giving and 20 Harding, Charity Law, 13. 21 Harding, 'Religious Purposes', 161-166, arguing that a 'natural association of religion and charity performed a role similar to that played by the presumption of public benefit in modern cases' (at 162-3). 22 Decision of the Charity Commission on the Registration of the Preston Down Trust, 3 January 2014, paragraphs 37-43: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/336112/preston_down_trust_ful l_decision.pdf > accessed 15 August 2016. 23 Synge, The 'New' Public Benefit Requirement, 22-24; for example: in AG v Baxter (1684) 1 Vern 248 and AG v Hickman (1732) 2 Eq Cas Abr 193 that a charity to support impecunious and/or unemployed ministers would prima facie be valid; or in Cary v Abbot (1802) 7 Ves Jun 490 that a charity to fund the Catholic education and raising of poor orphans is valid. 24 Garton, Public Benefit, 106; for example, in Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14, 18 (Sir John Romilly MR). 25 As occurred in all three cases cited at n 23 above. In Thornton v Howe the charitable trust was upheld. 26 
Independent Schools Commission v Charity Commission [2012] Ch 214, [62], citing National Anti-Vivisection
Society [1948] 31, 41-42 (Lord Wright).
deter unscrupulous claimants. 27 Alternatively, a narrow definition of charity, not based on the broad public benefit requirement, would have given the court greater control over the availability of the benefits of charity law. Whilst these suggestions are theoretically sensible, they are not accurate as none of the key cases ever mention cy-près, despite its longstanding existence by the nineteenth century. 
The 'purpose of charity law': an incorrect hypothesis
Ridge has argued that, given that the purpose of the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 was to encourage benevolence to help relieve widespread Elizabethan poverty, '[i]t was uncontroversial… that purposes coming within the spirit and intendment of the preamble must provide some public benefit'. 29 In support, Ridge cites a chapter from Jones' work on the history of charity. 30 This argument would seemingly explain the origins of the public benefit requirement.
However, three responses may be made. First, poverty was only one example of the types of charity the 1601 Act discussed; for example, the Act also discusses the 'Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Seabankes and Highwaies'. In the section of his work Ridge cited in support of her argument, Jones himself recognises the relief of poverty was only the Act's 'principal manifestation', not a prerequisite. 31 Second, the actual purpose of the Act was not concerned with redefining the law of charity -rather its purpose was to remedy the widespread misappropriation of funds given to charitable uses. 32 Third, even if the statute was aimed at promoting the public benefit this does not necessarily mean that 'aiming at the public benefit' was made a definitional element of a charitable trust. Turning an underlying idea into a definitional element is a very modern approach to law, and one that does not fit with nineteenth century charity cases. In short, Ridge's argument does not accurately reflect how the Act was understood at the time or during the nineteenth century, so it need not be considered further. 
III. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT REQUIREMENT -A BROADER HISTORY
Before 1736, judges had rarely been asked to consider whether a particular trust was charitable or not; the main question with which they had to deal, if any, was whether a particular trust amounted to a superstitious use. 34 However, as the issue of charitable validity became more commonly raised in court, judges chiefly asked whether charitable purposes were within the wording or the 'spirit and intendment' of the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 to determine charitable validity. 35 No substantive guidance seems to have been given on what 'within the spirit and intendment' means, so as time went by it was inevitable that some more concrete guidance would be needed on what constitutes a valid charitable trust.
As section IV will show, the first express judicial use of the public benefit requirement to conclusively determine charitable validity seems to occur in 1862. 36 This section will track the other sources which implicitly, obiter or non-judicially discussed before 1862 the need for public benefit for valid charitable trusts. Although numerous charity-related Acts of Parliament were enacted throughout the nineteenth century, 37 none of them mentions anything like a public benefit requirement. 38 Therefore, this section will focus on other sources, and will consider implied judicial references, arguments of counsel, other primary sources and contemporaneous academic material.
Implied judicial references
From the mid-eighteenth century, we see judges making implied references to the need for public benefit in charitable trusts. 39 At first, these references were largely either obiter, confined to a particular context, or broad rhetorical phrases meant more as a description or explanation of the result, rather than a prescriptive requirement on which charitable validity depended. This was often because the desired outcome could be achieved by the application of 34 a different legal principle. However, given the frequency and strength of such rhetoric, it is easy to see how, over time, references to the need for public benefit might have evolved, or could have been turned, from a descriptive obiter reason for a particular decision to a prescriptive requirement which novel purposes had to satisfy to determine charitable validity.
In AG v Pearce in 1740, Lord Hardwicke stated that 'in the extensiveness of the benefit accruing from [the purportedly charitable dispositions] they may very properly be called publick charities'. 40 This phrase, which seems like a broad statement of the second sense of the public benefit requirement (cross-sectional benefit), was cited in at least one later judgment.
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Importantly, however, Pearce concerned a gift for the relief of the poor of a parish.
'Poor relations' charitable trusts originally counted as private charity, but only public charities could be enforced by the court (hence the adjective 'public' being a key issue in poverty cases). 42 We must therefore be wary of conflating judicial discussion of 'public benefit' and discussions of the public-private charity distinction. Thus, given that Pearce is also our earliest reference, we should treat it with some scepticism as the source of the public benefit Lord Camden's remarks should also be caveated as they were made in the peculiar context of a mortmain dispute (the significance of which will be explained in section VI below).
Our fourth implied judicial reference to the public benefit requirement comes in 1792.
In Grieves v Case, the Court of Chancery held that land devised to poor dissenting ministers of certain chapels 'was a charitable use, in respect of the benefit the congregations were meant to derive from the preaching of their teachers'. 54 on this issue, but it seems that the court's focus was on what the public is meant to derive. This is arguably a reference to the first sense of public benefit (demonstrable public benefit) as the court seems concerned with what, conceptually, the particular charitable purpose would provide the public. However, the phrase 'in respect of' suggests the court stopped short of saying that in all cases a trust is charitable because it is for the public benefit, so at best this is an implied reference. Furthermore, Grieves was another mortmain case so its remarks must be seen in that peculiar context (explained in section VI below).
Finally, in 1824 Leach VC stated that funds given 'for any legal, public or general purpose, are charitable funds to be administered by Courts of Equity'.
55 This is certainly well short of an explicit public benefit requirement in the first sense (conceptual public benefit), although that is because Leach VC believed it was the source of a fund which determined its charitable status rather than its purpose so there would simply have been no need to require public benefit. 56 Despite this, within fifty years this quotation was cited by judges in three subsequent cases, implying such connections were actually in judges' minds and not mere rhetorical flourishes.
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Thus, from the mid-eighteenth century we see statements about the public nature of charitable trusts which roughly map the first and second senses of the public benefit requirement. Often these early statements are only rhetorical descriptions of the instant charity or obiter remarks. However, the repeated nature of these statements mean that over the nineteenth century we begin to see suggestions that the public nature of a charity can and should be used to help determine charitable validity. This is the natural precursor to judicial adoption of a new prescriptive requirement.
Counsel's references
Simultaneously, we see a similar trend in reported arguments of counsel, demonstrating a kind of intellectual feedback loop with judges' remarks. These arguments occur at a time when the specialist Chancery bar increased in size fivefold, with common law barristers 'seldom' arguing cases in Chancery. 58 This was also at a time when the merging of the equity and common law courts raised the possibility of common law judges hearing technical equity cases. In such an arrangement, non-expert judges were possibly more easily influenced by intuitive public benefit arguments from specialist Chancery advocates, potentially encouraging the slip from description to prescription for public benefit in charity law.
In the seminal Morice v Bishop of Durham
59 we see references by four different barristers to public benefit in the first sense (demonstrable public benefit) -interestingly, from both sides of the dispute. The testator purported to make a trust for 'such objects of benevolence and liberality as the trustee in his own discretion shall most approve'. At first instance, Samuel
Romilly and Mr Bell argued that the word 'liberality' could not be charitable, 'not even importing any thing of a public nature; from which the public is to derive any benefit'.
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Similarly, on appeal Mr Richards and Mr Martin argued that 'upon the authorities almost every thing, from which the public derive benefit, may be considered a charity', 61 although the report cites no authorities for this proposition. Both courts held the disposition void on the ground that 'liberality' was so much wider than 'charity' that it was impossible to define and enforce by the court, so public benefit did not feature heavily in either judgment. However, Morice is important because it marked a turning point in religious charitable trusts generally, and arguably led to the explicit discussion of a public benefit requirement in Cocks v Manners.
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Within three years, Samuel Romilly again references public benefit in the first sense.
In AG v Fowler, Romilly (along with Mr Cooke) argued that '[t]o the description of a Charity, in the enlarged sense of this Court, two qualities are attached: 1st, it must be a public benefit'.
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Unlike in Morice, here Romilly seems to positively state public benefit in the first sense (demonstrable public benefit) as a requirement of charitable validity. Although this may have been necessary for Romilly's overarching position -that a Protestant dissenting chapel could not be the subject of a charitable trust -it is repeated arguments like this, coupled with judicial inexperience, which could have caused the public benefit issue to slide from being a description to a requirement in judges' minds. (incidental private benefit) was used to successfully claim that a gift of land to support a family tomb was not charitable. 65 In 1832, while arguing that the keeping of a stock of corn for the local market was a charity, Sir Edward Sugden and Mr Bethell submitted that '[a] provision for building or repairing bridges, or doing any other act for the public benefit, is a charity'. 66 This suggests that (conceptual) public benefit in the first sense is invariably present in valid charities.
Although again this stops just short of suggesting a requirement of public benefit in the first sense, it is another example of lawyers linking actions for the public benefit and charitable trusts.
Interestingly, the final example of counsel arguing for any kind of public benefit requirement comes just two years before judges started relying on the requirement, and after a lapse of nearly thirty years. In 1860, Mr Higgins argued that a testamentary gift for twenty 'aged spinsters and widows' of a particular parish 'is void as a gift to charity; it is neither a gift for any purpose of general public utility nor for the relief of poverty'. 67 This goes further than the previous quoted arguments of counsel as it suggests that a lack of public benefit in the first sense (conceptual public benefit) renders a charitable trust void.
Other primary sources
Two other primary sources have some relevance: a reading by Sir Francis Moore and the publications of the Charity Commissioners.
It has been claimed 68 that in a reading on the Statute of Charitable Uses in 1607, Sir
Francis Moore 'emphasised… that all charitable uses were "publique" uses'. 69 This is interesting because Moore was potentially one of the drafters of the statute; this would arguably tie the public nature of charitable trusts to the origins of charitable trusts law. 70 Regardless, although Moore's own manuscript apparently contained this reference, 71 this author can find no such quotation in any of the three original published versions of Moore's reading.
Furthermore, even if the quotation were correct, it is nearly 150 years before we see even broad judicial suggestions of the public benefit requirement for a valid charitable trust. 73 Therefore, unless Moore's copy of the reading was later (re)printed in an unknown source, the quotation above cannot have been too influential.
An alternative source is provided by the publications of the Charity Commission, which was permanently established in 1853. 74 The vast majority of their work was concerned with trustee management and cy-près applications, 75 however they did sometimes discuss issues of charitable validity. 76 For example, between 1872 and 1895 the Charity Commissioners considered the charitable validity of at least seven purported charitable gifts to maintain tombs. 77 However, in none of these cases were issues of public benefit raised either by the Charity Commissioners or by the counsel advising them. This is unsurprising; the main focus of the Charity Commissioners was on converting unusual or unsuccessful charitable purposes to useful, 'normal' charitable purposes rather than pushing the boundaries of charitable validity, where issues of public benefit are most likely to be relevant. Furthermore, even when decisions of the Charity Commissioners were appealed, the courts essentially treated the matter as one of (what we now call) procedural administrative review rather than a substantive legal appeal of the Commissioners' decision itself. 78 This meant that in deciding appeals the courts focussed on whether the Commissioners had exceeded their powers or had made a 'gross miscarriage' in making their decision -not on whether the particular judge would have settled the money on a (substantively) slightly different trust. 79 In short, the nature of the work the Charity Commissioners undertook was unlikely to give rise to discussions of public benefit in the context of charitable validity, so their publications are not an overly useful source for present purposes.
Textbooks and dictionaries
In addition to primary sources, we see occasional references to public benefit in connection Abridgement Viner discusses cases where the validity of the words used in the purportedly charitable disposition was considered, the closest he comes to suggesting a public benefit requirement is in describing cases which evidence obvious public benefit.
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This inconsistency in the relevance of public benefit leaves a gap between our useful sources from 1793 until 1860. Interestingly, this is exactly the same period in which the usage of public benefit begin the transition from obiter rhetoric to prescriptive requirement.
Conclusion to the broader history
The broader history of the public benefit requirement suggests that 1740 until 1860 was a key period of development. During this 120 year period the public nature of charitable trusts begins to evolve from offhand remarks about particular charities, to a common factor in charitable trusts law cited by judges, barristers and textbook writers. Indeed, at the very end of this period we see counsel arguing that a lack of public benefit in the first sense renders a charity void; although this argument was not commented on by the judge in the case, such arguments are the necessary precursor to judicial acceptance of the public benefit requirement. It is against this background that the history of the public benefit requirement as a determinative principle in court judgments will now be mapped.
IV. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT REQUIREMENT -ITS HISTORY IN JUDGMENTS
Although the public benefit requirement was only written into English statute in 2006, 94 and the distinction between its first and second senses only formally judicially recognised in 2011, 95 we see judges explicitly relying on the public benefit requirement alone to conclusively determine issues of charitable validity over 140 years earlier. As explained above, before then judges had chiefly asked whether charitable purposes were within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 to determine charitable validity.
The first case in which public benefit was held expressly to be decisive of charitable validity seems to be in Rickard v Robson in 1862. There, using similar language to counsel, Sir John Romilly MR 96 says 'a gift merely for the purpose of keeping up a tomb or building which is of no public benefit, and only an individual advantage, is not a charitable use but a perpetuity'. Conversely, 'if the gift is to keep up an institution for the benefit of the public, then it is clearly a charity'. 97 Romilly MR thus holds that public benefit in the second sense is a necessary condition for a charitable trust as a trust yielding 'only an individual advantage' is not a charity; this arguably raises both cross-sectional public benefit and incidental private benefit. Romilly MR, however, did not attempt to distinguish between the two senses of public benefit; indeed, his judgment seems to conflate the two by suggesting that the trust was not charitable under the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (the first sense; conceptual) because it did not provide benefit to a sufficient section of the population (the second sense; cross-sectional). to those mentioned in the statute of Elizabeth-therefore for charitable purposes'. 98 Although this scatter-gun reasoning aims to cover all possible justifications for a finding of charity to support the court's desired result, within it is a clear suggestion that if a charity's purpose provides public benefit in the first sense (conceptual public benefit) then it will be a valid charitable trust. Therefore, Beaumont uses public benefit in the first sense being to justify the validity of a new type of charitable trust. It is interesting to observe that both senses of the public benefit requirement can arguably be traced to cases in the 1860s, although those cases did not distinguish the two.
The third explicit judicial reference is from the important 1871 case of Cocks v
Manners. 99 In discussing the validity of testamentary gifts to two orders of Roman Catholic nuns, Wickens VC stated that 'religious purposes are charitable, but that can only be true as to religious services tending directly or indirectly towards the instruction or the edification of the public'. 100 Because one of the donees was a set of cloistered nuns, Wickens VC accordingly used the lack of public benefit in the first sense (demonstrable public benefit), as the purpose did not 'tend' to meaningful benefit, to justify invalidating the purported religious charitable trust. 101 This seems to be the first example of public benefit in the first sense being used to invalidate a purported charitable trust. Unfortunately, however, Wickens VC seems to conflate
Garton's two parts of public benefit in the first sense by suggesting that a religious trust for cloistered nuns was 'neither within the letter nor the spirit' of the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (conceptual) because such a trust would not tend to benefit to the public (demonstrable).
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In 1875, the Privy Council adopted a similar approach. 103 A testatrix had left a will directing, amongst other things, 'that a house for performing religious ceremonies to my late husband and myself be erected'. 104 The court held that 'gifts for purposes useful and beneficial to the public… in a wide sense of the term, are called charitable uses' (conceptual public benefit public'. 106 The court concluded that the disposition 'does not seem to fall within any definition of a charitable duty or use. The observance of it can lead to no public advantage, and can benefit or solace only the family itself'. 107 Once more we see the court using a lack of public benefit in the second sense (incidental private benefit) to justify invalidating a purported religious charitable trust.
A thinly-reasoned example arose in the House of Lords in 1882. 108 In upholding the charitable status of oyster fishing rights held by the Saltash Corporation for the benefit of Saltash freemen, Earl Cairns stated that it was 'a charitable, that is to say a public, trust or interest, for the benefit of the free inhabitants of ancient tenements'. 109 Although no substantive discussion was given to why such an arrangement involves a charitable trust, the conclusion that the charitable trust was valid seems to be premised on the presence of (conceptual) public benefit in the first sense. This quotation was cited three times in 1888, including by Lindley LJ who, just five years later, gave his own version of the public benefit requirement. 110 Earl Cairns also alluded to (cross-sectional) public benefit in the second sense to justify his conclusion when he stated that the trust would not be void for being 'for the benefit of private individuals or a fluctuating body of private individuals'.
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In 1885 we find our first clear use of the public benefit requirement in the second sense in upholding a charitable trust. Derby Railway Servants Orphanage applied to court to confirm that it was exempt from district rates under the Public Health Act 1875 on the basis that it occupied its property 'exclusively for the purposes of public charity'. 112 In holding that the orphanage was such a charity, and exempt from the rates, Manisty J assumed that its purposes were charitable in nature. 113 The only question was thus 'whether this charity is not for a large and extensive section of the community' to qualify as a public charity under the Act. 114 After citing Lord Hardwicke's remarks from Pearce, extracted above, 115 Manisty J concluded that 'this charity is extensive. It extends to the whole of the railway servants all over England'.
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This short decision contains what seems to be the first use of the second sense of the (crosssectional) public benefit requirement to justify upholding charitable status. Furthermore, Manisty J's decision impliedly suggests a difference between being charitable in nature (conceptual public benefit) and being for the benefit of a sufficient section of the public (crosssectional public benefit) -arguably implying a difference between two senses of public benefit.
In the late 1880s two further decisions at first instance held that a lack of public benefit in the second sense (incidental private benefit) justified invalidating a purported religious charitable trust. First, in 1886 North J cited and followed the above passages from Romilly MR's judgment in Rickard to hold that a charitable trust to keep in repair a churchyard was 'for the benefit of the parish at large', but a trust to keep in repair a family tomb was 'only prayer and devotion by its own members, and which has no wider scope, no public element, no purposes of general utility, would be a "religious" society, but not a "charitable" one'. 124 On the facts, however, since no particular religious societies were named the court assumed the trust would be charitable.
Finally, in 1895, two relevant charitable trust cases were decided within three months which relied on different senses of the public benefit requirement. In the first, Chitty J, using similar language to his 1888 judgment, stated that '[t]o be a charity there must be some public purpose -something tending to the benefit of the community'. 125 Applying this, Chitty J accepted that gifts to support anti-vivisection organisations could be charitable trusts since they were for the public benefit in the first sense (conceptual public benefit). Interestingly, Chitty J also stated that 'whether, if [the organisations] achieved their object, the community would, in fact, be benefited is a question on which I think the Court is not required to express an opinion'. 126 This suggests that at least Chitty J regarded positive proof of demonstrable public benefit as unnecessary for charitable validity; it is unclear whether he would have also stated a proven lack of such benefit is irrelevant. By 1895, we thus cannot be sure that the courts distinguished the different senses of the public benefit requirement.
In the second 1895 case, Re Nottage (No 1), both Kekewich J and the Court of Appeal held invalid a bequest to support the Yacht Racing Association and establish a yachting competition. 127 Kekewich J stated that 'in order to find that a gift is charitable, the Court must come to the conclusion that the benefit of the community is the direct, and not the remote, object of the gift' but concluded that the purported charity did not do this. 128 Kekewich J thus seems to be the first judge to rely on a refined version of the first sense of the public benefit requirement (demonstrable public benefit) to invalidate a purported charitable trust because the nature of the benefit to the community from the Yacht Racing Association was too indirect. On appeal, Lopes LJ confirmed that the purported charitable trust was invalid but stated that this was because its object was 'the encouragement of a mere sport or game primarily calculated to amuse individuals apart from the community at large'. 129 Lopes LJ seems to be relying on the second sense of the public benefit requirement (incidental private benefit) to justify the same conclusion as Kekewich J; that the bequest did not create a charitable trust. Re Nottage thus confirms that both senses of the public benefit requirement were used by judges to invalidate purported charitable trusts, and that judges still had difficulty agreeing on which senses were relevant in each case.
To summarise, between 1862 and 1895 we see the public benefit requirement explicitly used to determine charitable validity in twelve different judgments, five of which were at Court of Appeal level or higher. Importantly, in these first cases we see different senses of the public benefit requirement being distinguished. We see in the early cases judges using both of the two senses of the public benefit requirement as distinguished by the Upper Tribunal in the Independent Schools Council case (that the nature of the purpose benefits the community and that a sufficiently numerous cross-section are benefited). We also see those judges using all four of Garton's elements of public benefit (conceptual pubic benefit, demonstrable public benefit, cross-sectional public benefit and incidental private benefit). However, sadly these different senses or elements were never clearly distinguished. We also see the two senses of the public benefit from the Independent Schools Council case being used to justify both validating and invalidating a purported charitable trust; this is true for Garton's demonstrable and cross-sectional public benefit, but not for conceptual public benefit (which was only used to validate) or incidental private benefit (which, unsurprisingly, was only used to invalidate).
In short, proof of one aspect of public benefit could be used to justify the validation of a novel charitable trust (supporting, for example, anti-vivisection, the Royal Society or a town's oyster fishing rights) and the lack of one aspect could be used to invalidate a prima facie valid charitable trust (for example, a yachting cup or the maintenance of one's own grave). The only thing missing was a case explicitly discussing more than one aspect of the public benefit requirement to settle their independent existence and precisely when they were required.
V. CONTEXTUALISING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT 129 Ibid, 656. Rigby LJ seems to agree at 656.
Sections III and IV have shown that by the late nineteenth century, following over 100 years of references to public benefit rhetoric by judges, barristers and commentators, the public benefit requirement had become an established conceptual tool in cases concerning charitable validity. However, exactly why public benefit made the transition from rhetoric to requirement when it did is never made clear, and is not helped by the fact that references to public benefit were often very brief. But despite the primary sources failing to clearly explain this development, they do give a chronology to it. This section will therefore consider the other legal and social factors which explain the development of the public benefit requirement throughout the nineteenth century.
The major political, social and economic changes of the nineteenth century led to fundamental changes in philanthropy. 130 Indeed, from the late eighteenth century philanthropy became 'a social imperative' in the upper and middle classes, and the number of new charities being set up per year increased nearly threefold. 131 These changes put a greater number of charitable 'experiments in benevolence' before the courts. 132 The litigation relating to these experiments provided the courts with the perfect opportunity for doctrinal development as they had to decide whether these new types of purported charitable gifts were and should be validand had to develop the law accordingly.
Four specific factors will for the first time be posited as the key catalysts for the development of the public benefit requirement: (1) increased religious pluralism, (2) the birth of state education, (3) the birth of regular income taxation, and (4) the formalisation of the doctrine of precedent.
Nineteenth century religious pluralism
Thus far, the growth of religious pluralism in the nineteenth century is the only factor relevant to the development of the public benefit requirement which has received extended academic treatment. That treatment is largely constituted by the work of Professor Pauline Ridge, on whose work this sub-section draws. 133 However, this article goes further than Ridge in arguing that the growth in religious pluralism is only one relevant factor in the development of the public benefit requirement.
groups, the early pace of change was relatively slow. This changed from the end of the eighteenth century. In just over half a century, the Toleration Act provisions were extended to Roman Catholic groups, 140 Jewish groups, 141 and Unitarian worship. 142 More specifically, charitable trusts for most Roman Catholic, 143 Unitarian, 144 and Jewish 145 groups were permitted from the mid-nineteenth century. Given the legal and financial benefits obtained by charitable status, 146 as the nineteenth century progressed, the courts were increasingly confronted with diversity in religious giving. 147 For example, charitable trusts supporting the Moravian Church's missionary efforts in 'heathen nations' and gifts to closed female Catholic orders. 148 Simultaneously, women were increasingly becoming involved in and litigating such trusts as these 'newer' religious groups often offered greater opportunities for leadership. 149 At a similar time, the old law of 'superstitious uses' was being relaxed. 150 A superstitious use was a use 'which has for its object the propagation of the rites of a religion not tolerated by law'. 151 Such dispositions would be held invalid, although if 'a general intention of piety' could be discovered the gift would often be applied cy-près. 152 There was 'no Statute making superstitious uses void generally', 153 although there had been three pieces of legislation relevant to superstitious uses. 154 However, those statutes were, respectively, mainly focussed on mortmain, only applied retroactively to the previous five years, and temporary. 155 Despite this lack of solid statutory basis, there were frequent findings of superstitious uses from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 156 It was not until the aforementioned statutes officially accepted nonstandard religions that courts began to decrease the frequency of finding a charitable gift to be superstitious 157 (although there were still some superstitious use cases 158 ).
Throughout this period of social change, the law, and in particular the courts, had to substantively justify which forms of religion should be awarded charitable status. 159 This task was more difficult than historically it had been. They could no longer rely on an assumed public consensus as to the value of all lawful religion; indeed, prejudices towards Catholicism led to suggestions that not all religious purposes were beneficial. 160 However, courts could not distinguish religions arbitrarily. 161 Some yardstick was therefore needed to enable courts to justify decisions on which religious charitable purposes would be upheld.
The courts adopted two strategies. First, as explained above, they focussed more closely on the Statute of Charitable Uses and only validated those purposes which fitted within the 'spirit and intendment' of the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 and its subsequent case law. The second strategy was to rely on the presence of public benefit. Given that the Statute of Charitable Uses only mentions one 'oblique' religious purpose -the 'Repaire of… Churches' -the 'culmination' of Morice was that in the majority of the difficult religious charity cases public benefit was key. 162 This meant that religious charity cases provided the perfect proving ground for this nascent requirement. Indeed, nearly one third of the cases cited above for explicit and implicit support for a public benefit requirement are religious charity cases, 163 and one of them, Cocks v Manners, is believed to be the first decision on gifts to female religious orders under the Roman Catholic Charities Act 1831. 164 This shows the magnitude and immediacy of the impact that religious pluralism had on the development of the public benefit requirement -from the very first case on a particular religious issue, the public benefit requirement was needed and explicitly came to the fore.
The birth of state education
At the start of the nineteenth century, creating and maintaining educational establishments was 'largely left to private initiative', with benefactors often using charitable trusts as a vehicle for making such gifts. 165 However, from 1833 the state became increasingly involved in education nationwide, initially giving grants to educational initiatives and setting up educational commissions and, from 1870, providing primary schools where there were not enough private or church schools to serve all local children. . 167 An example of the increasing number of 'experimental' educational charities can be seen in one of the later judicial uses of the public benefit requirement; there, Chitty J justified upholding a society for the suppression of cruelty to animals on the basis that it supported 'the advancement of morals and education among men'.
educational purpose than common educational charities for schools, and was possibly encouraged by the increasing number of such non-standard charitable bequests in light of state education provision. Furthermore, debates about educational change were often intertwined with debates about religious pluralism, meaning that experimental educational trusts often had an added element of controversy or novelty which demanded new substantive reasoning.
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Hackney has argued that until the 1930s it was only 'largely' through charities that poor children could receive any advanced education, thus cocooning educational charities from the effects of social change. 170 However, it is respectfully submitted that even if this is true, we still see a wide variety of purported charitable gifts to educational purposes in the nineteenth century, for example, to museums, academic societies and essay competitions. 171 These experiments in benevolence tested the boundaries of, and justifications for, charitable validity in these new contexts. The preamble to the 1601 Act did refer to certain charitable purposes, but these were very traditional: 'Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities'. Thus, as philanthropic gifts were increasingly made for other institutions or types of education, the preamble alone could not provide authority for the charitable status of such gifts. The public benefit requirement would have been a sensible supplement to justify distinguishing cases.
In essence, the influence of the changes in education was negative -there was a decreasing need for one very common charitable purpose. This, combined with a broadening approach to religious matters, created the opportunity for wider individual charitable purposes to be raised in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Decisions on these wider purposes would have needed some sort of justifiable test and the public benefit requirement would have been a sensible response to that need.
Taxation
In 1799 the Duties upon Income Act was passed as a way of raising funds for the Napoleonic It was thus the introduction of new permanent methods of taxation, with an exception for 'charitable purposes', which gave rise to possibly the most famous standalone charitable validity decision. By 1891 we had seen several explicit references to a public benefit requirement, and the social and legal changes of the nineteenth century had largely taken place, so the timing of Pemsel meant it was likely that the presence of public benefit would feature in its seminal definition of charity.
The formalisation of the doctrine of precedent
There is evidence from the seventeenth century that reports of the Court of Chancery focussed more on prior similar actions than judicial comments, 185 arguably because the court was concerned more with the merits of individual cases than applying legal rules. 186 Furthermore,
Winders' thorough survey of the history of precedent in the Court of Chancery shows that judges from the seventeenth century often 'consciously and deliberately relied on previous decisions'. 187 However, at this stage the courts seem to focus on the principles underlying a line of previous decisions, and not on particular decisions themselves. 188 Yet, as has been traced in detail elsewhere, from the beginning of the nineteenth century a more formalised doctrine of precedent starts to emerge. 189 Hence, in 1834, James Ram's extensive survey of early nineteenth century cases led him to suggest that even a single decision 'may become so fast settled, that the Courts of Westminster Hall may not be able to overturn, or even to shake it, and on the contrary may be bound to follow and establish it'. 190 Not long from 1895 the Court of Appeal took a strict approach to the binding status of its own decisions. 192 It was thus in the second half of the nineteenth century that 'the concept of rules of precedent becomes firmly established', although 'many details and refinements of the new systems remained to be worked out in the twentieth century'. 193 Evans has argued that this development had two main causes: the emergence of the modern structure of the courts, with a clearer hierarchy, and the influence of Benthamite reforms to the legal system generally. 194 It has also been suggested that Benthamite legal positivism, based on the premise that law is man-made not eternal or discoverable, 195 influenced judicial thinking. 196 However, although there is some evidence of Bentham's influence on the thinking of Sir Samuel Romilly 197 and Sir John Romilly MR, 198 there is no discernible link between these facts and the development of the public benefit requirement. Therefore, at least in this specific context, only Evans' first two reasons are reliable explanations for the development of precedent in our particular context.
The general development of the doctrine of precedent is reflected in cases concerning charitable trusts. For example, in the early nineteenth century we start to see references to 'the established doctrine of the court' and the 'settled rules of construction' as justifications for deciding charitable validity cases a particular way. 199 By the end of the century there is at least one explicit statement of the importance of first instance judges adhering to 'a series of decisions' in charitable validity cases. 200 Furthermore, in eight of the twelve cases cited above in which public benefit was decisive of charitable validity, the court referred to 'the authorities' or something similar in reaching its conclusion. 201 Three of those cases are explicitly followed in later nineteenth-century cases. 202 Similarly, we see later cases citing key passages from three of the five cases cited above in which the public benefit requirement was suggested or obiter. 203 Although these are not necessarily explicit appeals to a formal doctrine of precedent, the charitable trust cases display an increasing tendency on the part of judges to habitually reference and rely on previous cases when reaching decisions. With such a precedent-based attitude to previous decisions developing, it seems a natural consequence that the public benefit requirement could become formally entrenched in charity law as each judicial usage of it increased its status as a binding requirement.
VI. HOW CHANGE WAS MADE: BORROWING FROM THE LAW OF MORTMAIN
Section V has shown how four coalescing changes in nineteenth century law and society brought about a need for a change in charity law. Generally, charity law needed to be broadened to cope with the wider range of attempted charitable dispositions being made. However, there needed to be some judicial principle to regulate and consistently justify permissible charitable dispositions, otherwise standard rules of taxation, for example, could be too easily avoided or too harshly applied. When faced with these pressures, judges did not really develop new law, but instead reached for something familiar in a closely related context. The concept which nineteenth century judges used was the public benefit requirement in both its senses -that a disposition had to benefit a section of the public both conceptually and in reality in order to be legally charitable. This was not a totally new concept -mortmain law cases since the turn of the nineteenth century had been discussing the relevance and impact of the presence of public benefit. It is argued here that in the latter nineteenth century, judges borrowed this analysis of public benefit from the mortmain cases, a very different context, to help develop the law of charity generally, thus giving rise to the public benefit requirement.
Mortmain was the alienation of any lands or tenements to a perpetual legal person, such as a corporation or a charitable trust. The law of mortmain can be traced back to the statute de Viris Religiosis in 1279, 204 and originally focussed on preventing dispositions by will of land to corporations. Accordingly, over time those who wanted to endow the church had to find an alternative method: would-be donors turned to the charitable trust. 205 In response, the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1736 invalidated any dispositions of land by will to charitable trusts and those made inter vivos within the year preceding the donor's death. 206 Although originally concerned with preventing the avoidance of feudal incidents, the aim of the law of mortmain after the 1736 Act was to stop potentially perpetual charitable trusts acquiring title to all land in the country, thereby locking it up forever, and, more specifically, to quash the fear that clerics would 'terrorise [the dying] into making death-bed devises ad pias causas to the ruin of their heirs'. 207 This was part of the law's longstanding concern 208 to limit perpetual devises generally through, for example, the rule(s) against trust perpetuities 209 and unbarrable entails.
The mortmain statute of 1736, 'the language of which is certainly very general', 210 did not define 'charitable' and it was for the courts to determine its remit. Importantly, in mortmain cases (that is, cases concerning attempted dispositions of land by will to charitable trusts) courts decreed charitable status where they wanted to invalidate the disposition -if the disposition was not charitable, it did not come within the 1736 Act and was a valid gift of land. This means a finding of charitable status was often detrimental to the donee in mortmain, despite usually being a benefit in non-mortmain cases. 211 The courts were therefore using charitable status in two very different ways in these two kinds of cases.
The courts took a very expansive approach to the 1736 Act 212 as it was 'a remedial Act, and therefore… to be construed liberally and beneficially, so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy'. 213 This approach was supported by the Act's preamble which stated that gifts of land to charities were 'prejudicial to and against the common Utility'. Although not the only possible means of doing so, a finding of charitable status, followed by invalidation under the Mortmain Act, was believed to be the best way of protecting next-of-kin from deathbed dispositions.
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This expansive approach to the legal meaning of charity prompted increasing numbers of gifts of land to nonstandard purposes to try to avoid the effect of mortmain. 215 The courts' purposive approach to the legislation in turn led to an increasingly broad interpretation of what counts as charitable in mortmain cases. For example, Lord Camden's broad 'definition' of charity, a gift to a general public use, which was probably the widest approach to charity seen in judicial language by the end of the eighteenth century, was given to enable the voiding of a gift to build and maintain water conduits and reservoirs in Chepstow. 216 Similarly, in a mortmain dispute concerning a charity to establish a school for local needy children and the testators' descendants, Lord Loughborough stated that 'as far as [the purpose] tends to establish a charity for general purposes, it is void, by the statute of Mortmain'. 217 Within a decade, Lord Eldon held that a devise to set up a botanical garden was charitable merely 'upon the expression of the testator, that he trusted it would be a public benefit'. 218 Usually courts were very wary of following the words of testators, 219 but here it was done to be able to declare the disposition void under the Mortmain Act. This is a good example of an unusual purpose being held to be charitable under the Mortmain Act.
Shortly after, in the British Museum case of 1826 (concerning another nonstandard purpose -a gift to the British Museum), the word 'charity' under the Act was 'virtually equated' with 'public'. 220 There Leach VC stated that 'every gift for a public purpose, whether local or general, is within the [1736 Act], although not a charitable use within the common and narrow sense of those words'. 221 This very broad attitude to charitable status prompted one commentator to state that 'there is no reported case of a devise [of land] being saved from the Mortmain Act… by a finding that the particular public object was not charitable'.
It is true that the courts essentially answered the same legal question in mortmain and non-mortmain charitable trusts cases -whether the purported charitable purpose was valid.
However, the above examples show that the courts approached that question in mortmain cases with an inherent bias towards validating the charitable purpose in order to hold the disposition of land void -unlike in non-mortmain cases, where the starting point was that the supporters of a novel charitable purpose had to justify it being upheld. This is because the underlying policy question in the two situations was very different: is this disposition likely to lock up land perpetually contrary to legislation (mortmain), or is this purpose legally worthy of the legal, financial and social benefits of charitable status in perpetuity (non-mortmain). The former question favours finding charitable status to invalidate a disposition; the latter question favours withholding charitable status to maintain taxation revenues and protect resources from perpetual alienation. It is thus submitted that the court's approach in mortmain cases is so different to the court's approach in non-mortmain cases that the two situations should be seen as separate streams of precedent. cases not subject to a purposively-interpreted statute.
Mortmain law: the relevance
Interestingly, these mortmain cases were decided between 1736 and 1891. This almost exactly maps the period of development of the public benefit requirement for charitable trust validity.
The coincidence in time periods perhaps explains the tendency for mortmain cases to creep into non-mortmain charitable trust cases. This is further supported by the fact that, at least in the nineteenth century, the courts would use type of legal giving as it was only from the nineteenth century that assets of considerable value other than land increased substantially. 243 It is thus possible that judges and lawyers unintentionally introduced the importance of public benefit, traditionally only relevant to charitable gifts of land, into new discussions concerning charitable gifts of personalty.
Conversely, this doctrinal borrowing may have been a tactical choice by judges who wished to use the broad mortmain approach to defining charity to facilitate generosity towards novel (now socially favoured) charities. It is submitted that given the frequency of this intermingling of mortmain cases and non-mortmain cases, it is unlikely that this borrowing of the language of public benefit was wholly accidental. Furthermore, as has been shown in section V, during the nineteenth century society began to accept a much broader range of purposes as charitable. If generally adopted, the wide conception of public benefit developed in the (specific) statutory mortmain context to counter perpetuities would have allowed many of these new socially-acceptable charitable purposes to be granted legal validity in nonmortmain cases without the creation of new, untested legal ideas. In short, it would have been a sensible and easy step for nineteenth century judges to formalise a public benefit requirement by borrowing from mortmain cases in order to meet the pressures, caused by the first three factors outlined above, for a wider legal definition of charity generally. Once this was attempted a few times, as the cases in section IV evidence, the public benefit requirement could quickly become binding under the developing doctrine of precedent.
In summary, nineteenth century judges and counsel often drew no clear distinction between cases where a finding of charitable status was a benefit to the charitable purpose (where the charitable gift of personalty is valid) or a disadvantage (where mortmain invalidated a gift of land). When such a distinction is obscured the development of the rules of charitable validity seems haphazard at best. However, although it is unclear whether the continued use of the language of public benefit after the abolition of mortmain was always intentional, given the frequency of mortmain cross-referencing it seems plausible to suggest that judicial borrowing from mortmain cases was the source of the development of the public benefit requirement. Today, to be valid a charitable trust must be for the public benefit. However, just over 150 years ago, judges did not use the public benefit requirement to determine charitable validity.
This article has tracked the express and implied references to the public benefit requirement to describe its trajectory from a rhetorical device to a legal requirement. More importantly, this article has demonstrated that four legal and social factors coalesced in the nineteenth century to form the catalyst and need for the adoption of the public benefit requirement. The educational, religious and taxation changes of the nineteenth century provided the perfect opportunity for new charitable purposes to be tested and the criteria for charitable validity to be revised. In addition to historic references, the law of mortmain provided a transferrable conception of the public benefit requirement which could be adopted to regulate the changing law of charity under a developing doctrine of precedent.
